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Common Law Liability of the Liquor Vendor*
The law is in a state of conflict concerning the liability of
liquor vendors who contribute to the intoxication of tort-feasors.
This issue, which has been humorously expressed by Time inaga-
zine' in reporting a recent New Jersey case,2 resolves itself into the
question: should a tavern owner be liable in damages for injuries
caused - or suffered - by one of his intoxicated patrons? There
is something to be said in support of either side of this issue. On
one hand is the adage that no man is his brother's keeper. If one
who is intoxicated acts negligently and injures himself or another
person, the injury is the result of his deliberate act of becoming in-
toxicated and is therefore his direct responsibility. To hold other-
wise would subject the innkeeper to ruinous liability every time he
poured a drink, especially in the many cases in which he had no
direct knowledge or control of the situation.
On the other hand, the law has not been hesitant in shifting the
burdens of other types of "social insurance" to businessmen as a
cost of doing business,3 so why should it absolve the innkeeper?
The drunken driver is one of America's greatest menaces, and the
person with the most control over his actions is his source of alcohol
- the innkeeper. As it is the innkeeper's act in serving the liquor
which produces intoxication leading to subsequent injury, he should
be held primarily liable.
The controversy has produced two major developments in
American jurisprudence. First, over half the states have, at one
time or another, experimented with civil damage or "dram shop"
acts.4 Second, a number of jurisdictions have recently recognized
that a tavern owner may be liable at common law for injuries
resulting from his negligence in supplying liquor to an intoxicated
*This topic last received coverage in Ohio in Note, 9 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rav. 302
(1962), shortly after the landmark decision in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ. 188, 156
A.2d 1 (1959). Since then a number of states have accepted the common law theory
of recovery against tavern owners as a result of their negligent serving of intoxicated per-
sons, and the writer feels that another look at this rapidly changing area of the common
law is warranted.
1 "A tavern may be liable to an innocent third person injured by a drunk it has
helped tank up, but must it also be its pickled brother's keeper?" Time, April 15, 1966,
p. 80.
2 Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
3 For example, courts have long recognized that businessmen may be liable for the
negligent acts of their agents, and, in products liability cases, they have shifted the bur-
den of injury for negligent manufacturing to industry s shoulders.
4 According to a survey in Ogilvie, History and Apprasal of the IllMnois Dram Shop
Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 175, twenty-one states then had dram shop acts, and research
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person. It is the purpose of this Note to trace the history of the
latter development, including the present state of Ohio law, and
to discuss some of the special problems created by the new rule.
I. THE OLD COMMON LAW RULE DENYING RECOVERY
At common law a liquor vendor was not in any way liable to
an intoxicated customer who injured himself because of his condi-
tion,5 nor was he responsible for injuries to innocent third parties
resulting from his inebriated patron's negligent acts.6 The theory
generally advanced to sustain this rule holds that the drinking of
the liquor, not the serving of it, is the proximate cause of mtoxi-
cation and subsequent 'injury.' Another rationale supporting the
old common law rule is that injury to the patron or to a third person
is not a foreseeable result of the serving of liquor, and thus the inn-
keeper's act of supplying the intoxicants is too remote from any in-
jury to give rise to liability' And, against claims by the patron him-
self, there is the additional defense of contributory negligence.'
has revealed no subsequent enactments in other states. The twenty-one states which
still have such laws are: ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 121-22 (1958); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 30-102 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §5 715-16 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); IoWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (1954); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); McH. STAT. ANN. § 18.993 (Supp. 1965); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1953); NEV. REv. STAT. § 202.070 (1957); N.Y. GEN. OB-
LIGATiONS LAW 5 19-101; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-332 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE §
5-01-21 (1959); OHIo REv. CODE § 4399.01-.05; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 121
(1951), ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.730 (repl. 1955); R-I. GEN. LAws §5 3-11-1 to -5
(1956); S.D. CODE § 5-0208 (1939); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1959); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 71-08.080 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (1955); WYO.
STAT. 5 12-34 (1957)
5 Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal.
App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Supp.
308, 112 A.2d 892 (Super. Ct. 1955); Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App.
379, 28 S.E.2d 329 (1943); Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Buntin
v. Hutton, 206 II. App. 194 (1917); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d
328 (1966); Cavin v. Smith, 228 Minn. 322, 37 N.W.2d 368 (1949); Christoff v.
Gradsky, 140 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio C.P 1956)
6 Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1950); Collier v. Stamatis,
63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450
(1955); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949);
Freese v. Tripp, 70 II. 496 (1873); State ex -rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78
A.2d 754 (1951); Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955); Seibel v.
Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W 774 (1939)
See cases cited notes 5-6 supra.
8 Ibul.
9 Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (Super. Ct. 1955); Reed v.
Black Caesar's Forge Gourmet Restaurant, Inc., 165 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964), cert. demed, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211
A.2d 900 (1965); Moyer v. Lo Jim Cafe, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 523, 240 N.Y.S.2d 277
(1963), all'd, 14 N.Y.2d 792, 200 N.E.2d 212, 251 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1964)
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Although this common law tendency to "take the drunk as you
find him" found support in virtually every American jurisdiction
which had occasion to pass on the question of liability, a few courts
raised the possibility that tavern owners might owe some duty to
the drunkard to protect him from his own follies. The idea found
recognition in an 1883 Texas case' in which the court allowed
a widow to recover against three sober patrons of a bar who had
wagered with her alcoholic husband that he could not consume
three pints of whiskey at a sitting. Extremely inebriated at the time,
he attempted the feat and died from acute intoxication. This
concept of a duty owing to the individual who was past the stage
of helping himself found support in a few other jurisdictions.
The Iowa Supreme Court expressed the opinion that an action
might lie against an innkeeper if the person plied with intoxicants
was so helpless with drink that he was incapable of consenting
to the sales, but not otherwise." In Oregon, the state supreme
court stated that, independent of any statute, it was wrongful for
any person repeatedly and continuously to ply another with liquor
until intoxication was produced. The opinion held that an action
by a woman so mistreated could be maintained unless by voluntary
participation she could herself be said to be at fault.'" The embry-
onic idea of a duty owing to drunkards was thus closely associated
with the degree of the patron's helplessness, although contributory
negligence on his part would still bar recovery. In Illinois, these
emerging concepts culminated in the theory that sales of liquor to
a "strong and able-bodied man" were not actionable, since his volun-
tary act in becoming intoxicated was the proximate cause of any
resulting injuries.'8
If the common law courts were slow to formulate the notion
of a duty owed a drunkard by an innkeeper, they were even less
receptive to the idea that there was any duty owed third persons
to prevent their injury at the hands of the drunkard. Early cases
denying recovery to injured thurd persons from liquor vendors as
10 McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168, (1883). See also Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W.2d
832 (Ky. 1956), in which a package store proprietor sold a quart of whiskey to a drunk-
ard, knowing he had made a bet that he could consume it without stopping. Recovery
was allowed on the theory that this was an intentional tort against the drunkard, who
died from his feat.
11Bissell v. Starzinger, 112 Iowa 266, 83 N.W 1065 (1900) (by implication)
12 lbach v. Jackson, 148 Ore. 92, 35 P.2d 672 (1934).
18 Cruse v. Aden, 127 I1. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889). See the comments on this and
other Illinois cases in Moran, Theories of Liability in Actions Under the Illinois Dram
Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 191, 192.
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a result of the acts of their intoxicated patrons were legion. 4 True,
some authorities hinted that there might be liability to third persons
for certain exceptional acts of negligence on the part of liquor ven-
dors, but case support for these statements was scanty " The ear-
liest recorded case recognizing such liability awarded damages to a
slave owner because an innkeeper had negligently permitted a slave
to become intoxicated resulting in the slave's subsequent death. 6
In 1896 a Tennessee court held that the wife of an habitual
drunkard stated a cause of action by alleging that over her repeated
protests, the innkeeper continually sold liquor to her husband in
violation of a state statute (not a dram shop act)." The next
development in the common law rule seems to have occurred in
Pratt v Daly,8 a 1940 Arizona case holding that a married woman
who had the right to sue in her own name could recover against
an innkeeper for loss of consortium because that innkeeper sold
liquor to her alcoholic husband over her repeated protests." The
14 See cases cited notes 5-6 supra.
15 See, e.g., the following passage in Annot., 130 A.L.R. 352, 357 (1941)
While it is true that ordinarily a vendor of intoxicating liquors is not, at
common law, answerable to a third person for injury or damages sustained by
the latter as a result of the intoxication of the purchaser of the liquor, neverthe-
less it is established that in some circumstances a vendors sale of liquor may
constitute a willful violation of his duty to one other than the consumer
thereof and be the proximate cause of the injury sustained by such third per-
son, so that for such injury the latter may have a right of action at common
law against the vendor.
See also the following statement from 30 AM. JUR. Intoxicating Liquors § 520 (1958)
However, the common-law rule is generally qualified to the extent of giving a
right of action against one furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by the
intoxication of the person so furnished, where the liquor was given or sold to
a person who was in such a condition as to be deprived of his will power or
responsibility for his behavior, or to a habitual drunkard, or in violation of a
prohibitory statute. Moreover, liability is sometimes imposed upon proprie-
tors of liquor establishments for failure to exercise reasonable care to protect
patrons from injury at the hands of intoxicated fellow patrons. (Footnotes
omitted.)
16 Skinner v. Hughes, 13 Mo. 440 (1850).
17 Riden v. Grimm Bros., 97 Tenn. 220, 36 S.W 1097 (1896) The case seems to
have been overlooked in Tarwater v. Atlantic Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746
(1940), wherein the court refused to allow recovery against a defendant who distributed
a large amount of free beer to plaintiff's fellow workers, which resulted in plaintiff's in-
jury when one of the intoxicated workmen dropped a plank on his arm.
The distinguishing feature of a "dram shop" act as opposed to other liquor control
legislation is the imposition of civil liability upon a liquor vendor by creating a statu-
tory cause of action against him in favor of his patrons or, more usually, third parties
injured as a proximate result of the innkeeper's serving of his patron.
18 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940).
19 Arizona, however, has refused to allow recovery at common law to a non-relative,
as opposed to a relative, injured as a result of a drunkard's negligent acts. Collier v.
Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945)
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opinion relied heavily upon decisions holding that an action would
lie against druggists who sold habit-forming drugs to a plaintiff's
spouse with knowledge of their intended use.2 ° South Dakota fol-
lowed suit a few months later in a virtually identical fact situation.2'
Beyond the few exceptional cases noted above, it can safely be
said that until the late 1950's there was no action at common law
available to third persons injured by a drunkard as against a liquor
vendor who supplied the intoxicants. Nor could the inebriate him-
self recover for any injuries sustained, unless he was so helpless as
to be considered past the stage of consent when purchasing the
liquor. The few cases allowing recovery were those in which the
factual situations could be considered extreme, yet, even in the ex-
treme cases, recovery was generally limited to members of the
drunkard's immediate family.
11. CASE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON
LAW THEORY OF RECOVERY
The genuine assault upon the old common law rule denying re-
covery began in 1959, with the case of Waynmck v. Chicago's Last
Dep't Store.2 After excessive drinking in an Illinois bar, the intoxi-
cared patron drove across the state line into Michigan where his
negligent driving resulted in serious injury to motorists of that
state. Their petition, based upon diversity, alleged damages at com-
mon law as well as under the dram shop acts of both states. After
deciding that neither dram shop act applied extra-territorially,"
2 0 See Holleman v. Harward, 119 N.C. 150, 25 S.E. 972 (1896); Flandermeyer v.
Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912).
2 1 Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W 482 (1940).
22 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cit. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
2 3 Illinois courts have consistently held that unless the act leading to injury and the
injury itself both occur within the state, the Illinois Dram Shop Act, ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 43, §§ 135-36 (1963), does not apply. Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 IMI.
App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950). The court in Waynick theorized that Michigan
would apply the same rule for its dram shop act, and New York and Iowa would prob-
ably reach a similar result. See Liff v. Haezbroeck, 51 II. App. 2d 70, 200 N.E.2d 525
(1964) (applying Iowa law); Goodwin v. Young, 34 Hun 252 (N.Y. 1884) There is
a direct split of authority on this point, however. Connecticut has held that its dram
shop act is applicable against a state innkeeper, even though the resultant injury oc-
curred in New York. Zucker v. Vogt, 200 F. Supp. 340 (D. Conn. 1961) (applying
Connecticut law). Minnesota has likewise allowed extra-territorial application to its
act, apparently on the modern grouping-of-contacts theory of conflicts of law. Schmidt
v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957). The Waymck case has
received approval from the Illinois Court of Appeals in a case where the Illinois Dram
Shop Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, §§ 135-36 (1963), would not be applicable. Col-
ligan v. Cousar, 38 IM. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963) (following the prevailing
conflicts of laws principles, unproved Indiana law was applied as Illinois common law).
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the court stated that unless a remedy existed at common law the
plaintiffs could not recover, since the non-applicability of the acts
created a "vacuum" in the law In holding that a common law
negligence action would lie, the court cited the tort principles of
duty and proximate cause, concluding that the serving of the liquor
set off a forseeable chain of events for which the innkeeper was
ultimately responsible.
Fortified by the Waynck decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court started a wave of judicial commentary shortly thereafter with
its landmark decision in Rappaport v Nichols.24  The defendant,
Nichols, in violation of a New Jersey statute, served liquor to two
minors who later drove negligently into the plantiff's car, killing
two persons. Since New Jersey had no dram shop act 5 the petition
claimed damages solely on the common law theory. The opinion
stated that the prohibitory statute gave rise to a duty on the part
of innkeepers, for the protection of the public in general, not to
serve minors or intoxicated persons. Although the court alluded
to several analogous tort situations in which recovery has never
been questioned under the everyday principles of proximate cause
and forseeability, the main thrust of the decision stressed the ridicu-
lousness, considering the widespread use of automobiles on today's
highways, of holding that injury to third persons was not a forsee-
able result of the excessive serving and use of alcohol.
Since Rappaport there has been a steady erosion of the old com-
mon law rule, particularly in the eastern jurisdictions. In Mannzng
v Yokas,26 the plaintiff sued under Pennsylvania's civil damage act,
which provided that an innkeeper who wrongfully furnished alco-
holic beverages to a minor would be liable to anyone injured "in
consequence of such furnishing."2  It was held that the "in conse-
quence" language required a finding of proximate cause between
the act of the innkeeper and the resultant injury to the plaintiff.2"
The court, in rejecting the old common law rule that the fur-
nishing of liquor was not the proximate cause of the subsequent
24 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
25 The New Jersey Dram Shop Act, N.J. Session Laws, 1921, ch. 103, at 184, was
repealed by N.J. Session Laws, 1934, ch. 32, at 104.
26 389 Pa. 136, 132 A.2d 198 (1957).
27 Laws of Pa. 1854, No. 648, § 3, at 644.
28 Courts which have dealt with acts containing the "in consequence" language have
generally held that there must be a finding of proximate cause between the act of serv-
ing the liquor and the injury to the plaintiff. Shugart v. Egan, 83 Ill. 56 (1876). This
is to be contrasted with language in the statutes allowing recovery to one injured "by"
an intoxicated person, for which proximate cause need not be shown. See Voelker,
Parties to Dram Shop Actions, 1958 U. ILL. LF. 207, 214.
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injury, found that the innkeeper was "as much responsible for the
accident as if he had stripped the gears of the car or had damaged
the steering wheel, which defects in the operation of the car
were directly responsible for the uncontrollability which caused
the collision."2 One year later, in McKinney v. Foster,30 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court rejected the other half of the common law
rule, holding it quite forseeable that a minor who drank intoxi-
cating liquor in the defendant's bar would become drunk and drive
negligently, resulting in an accident. From these two decisions it
was but a short step to a recovery founded entirely upon the com-
mon law; Pennsylvania took that step in 1965, after the repeal of
the Civil Damage Act,"1 with the case of Jardine v. Upper Dar-
by Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 2 in which an injured pedestrian recovered
damages from the tavern which served intoxicants to the inebriate
who subsequently ran the plaintiff down. The court held intoxica-
tion itself to be the proximate cause of the accident and that the
plaintiff's injuries were therefore directly attributable to the defend-
ant. The following quotation is illustrative of the court's feeling
toward the innkeeper's duty-
The first prime requisite to de-intoxicate one who has, because
of alcohol, lost control over his reflexes, judgement and sense of re-
sponsibility to others, is to stop pouring alcohol into him. This is
a duty which everyone owes to society and to law entirely apart
from any statute . An intoxicated person behind the wheel of
an automobile can be as dangerous as an insane person with a fire-
arm. He is as much a hazard to the safety of the community as a
stick of dynamite that must be de-fused in order to be rendered
harmless. To serve an intoxicated person more liquor is to light
the fuse.3
Most recently, New York recognized that tavern owners might
be liable at common law for the negligent acts of their drunken
patrons. In Berkeley v. Park,4 a car driven by one of two intoxi-
cated youths collided head on with the plaintiff's car, killing two
persons and seriously injuring three others. The complaint alleged
damages under the New York Dram Shop Act?5 and at common
law. In upholding the common law portion of the complaint, the
29389 Pa. at 140, 132 A.2d at 200.
30 391 Pa. 221, 137 A.2d 502 (1958).
31 PA. STAT. A_NN. tt. 47, § 9-901 (1952).
82 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
331d. at 631-32, 198 A.2d at 553.
4 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
Or N.Y. GEN. OBLiGATioNs LAW S 11-101.
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New York court stated that Waynck and Rappaport had "rejected
as unreal the distinction that the selling of alcohol is only a
remote cause of resulting intoxication while the consumption is the
proximate cause." 6 The court elected to follow the Rappaport rea-
soning, stressing the duty of the tavern owner to protect the public
from intoxicated patrons and the readily forseeable result of
drunkenness - negligent driving.
Perhaps it is now socially acceptable to allow innocent third
parties to redress their injuries against tavern owners who set the
forces of harm in motion, but should the drunkard himself be al-
lowed to recover for his own negligent acts? The answer is increas-
ingly yes. The courts which have allowed the inebriated patron
to recover have made little or no distinction between his situation
and that of an injured third party And, as might be expected, Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey were among the first states to extend the
common law right of action to the drunkard himself.
In Schelin v Goldberg,"7 decided after the Pennsylvania Civil
Damage Act" was repealed, an intoxicated customer recovered
damages from an innkeeper after the patron's drunken insults pre-
cipitated a fight during which he was severely beaten by a fellow
customer. The tavern owner was held liable for the proximate
consequences of his negligence in serving a visibly intoxicated per-
son, including the forseeable assault on the plaintiff by the other
customer.
Pennsylvania stretched the Schelin rule to cover the more ex-
treme fact situation presented by Majors v Brodhead Hotel, Inc. 9
The plaintiff became intoxicated at a dance in the defendant's
hotel where drinks were served both at a bar and by "set-ups" at the
tables. While confined in the men's room, the plaintiff crawled
out of an open window and fell forty-five feet to a roof-top. The
court allowed him to recover for his injuries, even though he had
been served only one drink at the bar which was under the defend-
ant's surveillance.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently held that a com-
plaint stated a cause of action when it alleged that the negligent
sale of intoxicants to the plaintiff's husband while he was "visibly
intoxicated" proximately caused him to stumble and fatally strike
36 47 Misc. 2d at 383, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
37 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
8 Pa. Laws 1854, 663 § 3, which was repealed by Pa. Laws 1951, 90, 179 § 901.
39416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965)
[VoL 18: 251
LIQUOR VENDOR LIABILITY
his head against a pole.4" The court'reaffirmed the principles out-
lined in Rappaport and remarked that the tavern owner owed a
duty to the drunkard himself similar to that owed to innocent third
parties.41 As in Rappaport, the court limited recovery to situations
in which the inkeeper knew, or should have known, of the inebriate's
condition.42
A third state which has allowed the injured customer to recover
for his own negligent acts is New Hampshire. In Ramsey v.
Anctil,48 the plaintiff became highly intoxicated in defendant's bar
and, oblivious to the glass resting beneath his upraised arm, slammed
his fist on the counter, shattering the glass and severing a nerve in
his hand. The state supreme court cited Rappaport, Waynck,
and Schelin44 i holding that the action would lie.45
Several other jurisdictions have indicated their approval of a
common law cause of action in favor of either an injured third party
or the drunkard himself or both. In Davis v. Schtappacossee,46 the
Florida Supreme Court permitted a parent to recover from a liquor
vendor for the vehicular death of a minor son, one of a group of
minors to whom the defendant had sold whiskey. The situation was
exceptional in that the vendor never bothered to ascertain the ages
of his obviously immature customers and in that he served the liquor
to them in their car, so that negligent driving was an almost inevi-
table result. It seems, however, only a step from the exceptional
situation in Schtappacossee to the rule's application in questions of
ordinary third-party liability. In at least two other states, the courts
have recognized the right of an injured party to sue at common law
for an innkeeper's negligence, while dismissing the complaints for
inadequate pleading or evidence. A Tennessee court refused to hold
a vendor liable for subsequent injuries when he sold liquor to a
4 0 Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 585, 218 A.2d 630, 632 (1966).
411d. at 588, 218 A.2d at 633.
42 d. at 593, 218 A.2d at 637.
43 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965).
44Id. at 376, 211 A.2d at 901.
4 5 Ibid.
40 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963). The court relied heavily upon an analogy to Tami-
ami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Eta. 1959), in which a gun dealer was held
liable for injuries resulting from the sale of a firearm to a minor. See the analogous sit-
uations discussed in text accompanying notes 101-19 =fra. However, in the later case of
Reed v. Black Caesar's Forge Gourmet Restaurant, Inc., 165 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964), the court refused to allow the plaintiff to recover for the death of her hus-
band resulting from liquor served him while he was intoxicated. The court there
specifically reserved from consideration the possibility of the liquor vendor's liability to
third persons injured by an intoxicated patron.
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twenty-nine year-old automobile driver who was not drunk at the
time of purchase and who consumed none of the liquor on the
premises, although the several minors in the car subsequently be-
came intoxicated, took over operation of the vehicle, and, driving
recklessly, caused a fatal accident." Although it refused to impose
liability on the bartender, the court said:
We are unwilling to hold that, no matter what the circum-
stances, the act of the purchaser and not the sale constitute the
proximate cause of injury to third persons or that consumption of
the intoxicant is always an independent, intervening act which
breaks the chain of causation We can see little difference in
principle between the act of an owner entrusting an automobile to
one known to be an habitual drunkard and the act of a tavern
keeper in plying the driver of a car with intoxicants knowing that
he is likely to drive upon the public highway where he will become
a menace to third persons.48
Similarly, a Colorado court dismissed a complaint alleging
common law negligence on the part of a tavern owner but only
because it asserted that the violation of a state prohibitory statute
was negligence per se and that the complaint failed to show action-
able facts of negligence on the part of the innkeeper or a failure
to protect the plaintiffs from injury.49 The court indicated that a
properly worded complaint, based on common law principles,
would state a good cause of action."°
This grouping of cases is not to imply that the old common
law rule is now dead; rather, it seems to be dying the slow death of
the privity doctrine in products liability cases. Considering the
number of jurisdictions which accepted the old common law rule
and which have had no recent opportunity to reconsider their posi-
tions, it is probably still the majority rule in the country.
A few jurisdictions which have reconsidered the old common
law rule have rejected the Rappaport doctrine in its entirety."'
47 Mitchell v. Ketner, 393 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, Tenn.
Sup. Ct., July 6, 1965.
48 1d. at 759.
49 Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo. 425, 374 P.2d 351 (1962). The Colorado prohibitory
statute forbade the sale or gift of liquor to minors, intoxicated persons, or habitual
drunkards. The court held that this statute was strictly penal and could not be made
the basis of a civil action. The problem of whether or not violation of similar statutes
in other states constitutes negligence per se or merely evidence of negligence is discussed
in text accompanying notes 51-101 mfra.
GO Id. at 427-28, 374 P.2d at 352.
51 Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 891, 385 S.W.2d 656, 658 (1965); Elder v. Fisher,
205 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 990,
183 So. 2d 328, 331 (1966).
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Others have quaveringly adhered to the no-liability rule while re-
serving the right to change their minds. Wisconsin, for instance,
discussed the cases on both sides of the question in 19622 in decad-
ing whether the insurer-subrogee of a drunken driver may collect
from the tavern owner who had served him. The court finally held
that the insurer had no right to recover at common law, for to allow
such an action would have necessitated the overruling of two prior
Wisconsin cases.' The court then asserted:
We do not deem this a proper case in which to do so. Plain-
tiff stands in the shoes of the purchaser and consumer of the
alcoholic beverage, and not of the injured person. Under these
circumstances we fail to find compelling, equitable considerations
in plaintiff's favor which require this court to consider the advis-
ability of abandoning a common-law rule of long standing 54
And in 1965 an Indiana appellate court55 adhered to the old
line while leaving the door open to change. After holding that the
Indiana Dram Shop Act5 had been effectively repealed and that
there was no cause of action against the liquor vendor at common
law, the court asserted:
While we feel that this decision is well grounded on the com-
mon law as it now exists in this State, appellant's argument may
have sufficient merit, as evidenced by the recent trend in cases of
this nature, to warrant a re-exammation and possible reevaluation
of this area of the common law; particularly since the General
Assembly seems to have abandoned legislation heretofore in vogue
in respect to the subject matter.57
Apparently the Wisconsin Supreme Court is simply waiting for
a more desirable plaintiff than an insurance company before over-
turning the common law rule, while the Indiana court would like
to see more case authority in other jurisdictions. However, a change
in the law of both states seems imminent.
While the basic problem of whether a cause of action exists
against the liquor vendor at common law is a relatively simple
one, a number of jurisdictions have been faced with complications
in the forms of contributory negligence, the effect of a statute pro-
52 Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gasr, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117 N.W.2d 347 (1962).
53 Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W 774 (1939); Demge v. Feierstein, 222
Wis. 199, 268 N.W 210 (1936).
54 Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 354, 117 N.W.2d 347,
353 (1962).
55 Elder v. Fisher, 205 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965).
56Acts of the Indiana General Assembly 1933, ch. 79, § 1, ch. 80, § 40.
57 Elder v. Fisher, 205 N.B.2d 335, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965)
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hibiting sales of liquor to certain classes, and the pre-emptive effects
of the dram shop acts. These problems are more fully discussed
in the following section.
III. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS UNDER THE COMMON
LAW THEORY
A. The Role of Prohibitory Legzslation
Every state has one or more statutes prohibiting the sale of in-
toxicants to certain classes of people. All states prohibit sales to
minors;" most forbid any sales to visibly intoxicated persons or
habitual drunkards;59 a fair number include insane persons in the
58Sales to minors: ALA. CODE tt. 29, § 36 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 04.15.020
(1962); ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-244 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-901 (1964);
CAL. PEN. CODE § 397; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 75-2-37 (1963); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 30-86 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. it. 4, § 715(1) (1953); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 25-121 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.11 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 58-
1061 (1965); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 159-4 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-312
(1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (1944); IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-610 (1956);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.43 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-715 (1963); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 244.080 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. § 26:88 (1950); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 151 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 28, § 118 (1957); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 138, 5 34 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.1004 (1957); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340.73 (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. § 10223 (1952); MO. ANN. STAT. §
312.400 (1963), MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-35-106 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §
53-180 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 202.050 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 175.6
(1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1-77 (1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46-10-12 (1953); N.Y.
PEN. LAW 5 484(3), N.Y. ALCo. BEV. CONTROL LAW 5 65; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-
46 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-05-09 (1959); OHIO REV. CODE § 4301.22;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 3 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. 5 471.410 (1961); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(1) (1952); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3-8-1 (1956); S.C. CODE
§ 4-78(3) (1962); S.D. CODE 5 5-0226 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-142
(1955); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 666-26(b) (1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-7-15
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, 5 224 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-112(a) (1950);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.44.270 (1962); W VA. CODE ANN. 5 5907(50)
(1951); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 176.30 (1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-33 (1957)
59 Liquor control acts in all states prohibit sales to at least one of these classes; most
prohibit sales to both. ALA. CODE Ut. 29, § 36 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 04.15.020
(1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-244 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-901 (1964);
CAL. PEN. CODE § 397; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 75-2-37 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 30-91 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tt. 4, § 715(5) (1953); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 25-121 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.50 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 58-1061
(1965); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 159-4 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-312 (1947);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (1944); IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-615 (1956); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 123.46 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-715 (1963); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
244. 080 (1963), LA. REV. STAT. 5 26:88 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 151
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118, 119 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188,
§ 69 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.1000 (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.73
(1957); MISS. CODE ANN. § 10223 (1952); MO. ANN. STAT. § 312.400 (1963);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 4-413 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 202.100 (1963); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 175:6 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46-10-13 (1953); N.Y. ALcO.
BEV. CONTROL LAW § 65; N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-05-09 (1959); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 4301.22; OKLA. STAT. ANN. it. 37, § 3 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 741.410
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prohibited class;"° and a few prohibit sales to criminals or inter-
dicted persons,6 and Indians. 2 These statutes typically provide
that anyone selling intoxicants to a member of the prohibited class
will be guilty of a misdemeanor. They differ from the dram shop
acts in that the former usually designate fines and penalties for
violators, while the latter specifically provide for civil liability.
The question has often arisen whether or not the violation of
these statutes constitutes actionable negligence by an innkeeper so as
to give the injured party a cause of action at common law. In states
which have dram shop acts, the answer has generally been no.
Thus, in Connecticut, it was held that the provisions of the Liquor
Control Act63 were criminal and penal in nature and did not give
rise to any civil liability. The court felt that the injury suffered was
not of the type the statute intended to guard against, hence a com-
mon law cause of action against the tavern owner based upon a
violation of the statute was not available." A similar result was
reached in Illinois, when recovery was attempted under the provi-
sions of the state prohibitory statute. The court there held that
the statute was primarily penal and regulatory and did not create a
civil liability.65
Other jurisdictions without dram shop acts have come to the
same conclusion, although the effect of the decisions has been to
leave the injured party with no redress whatsoever. The Supreme
Court of Arizona, in Collier v. Stamats,66 held that violation of a
statute making it a misdemeanor to sell liquor to a minor67 was not
actionable negligence so as to render the vendor liable in damages
(1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(1) (1952); R.I GEN. LAws ANN. § 3-8-1
(1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-78 (3) (1962); S.D. CODE § 5.0226 (1936); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 57-142(3) (1955); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 666-26(b) (1952); UTAH CODE
ANN. 5 32-7-14 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. t. 7, § 222 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-62
(1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.44.200 (1962); W VA. CODE ANN. § 5907.50
(1951); WIs. STAT. ANN. 5 76.26 (1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-33 (1957).
6 0 CAL. PEN. CODE § 397; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 175-6 (1960); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 715 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 119 (1957).
6 1 DEL. CODE ANN. tt. 4, § 715 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-929 (1948).
6 2 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-929 (1948).
63 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 545 (1960).
64 Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (Super. Ct. 1955).
6 Rogers v. Dwight, 145 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Wis. 1956) (applying Illinois law).
Illinois, of course, has said there is no cause of action against the tavern owner at com-
mon law. See Schulte v. Schleeper, 210 Ill. 357, 71 N.E. 325 (1904); Freese v. Tnipp,
70 IMI. 496 (1873). Contra, Colligan v. Cousar, 38 IMI. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292
(1963) (following the prevailing conflicts of law principles, unproved Indiana law
was applied as Illinois common law).
66 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945).
67 Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-244 (1956).
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to the minor's parents. The court said that the purpose of the
section was to regulate the business of selling intoxicants, not to
enlarge civil remedies.6" In a recent Arkansas case,6" the court
pointed out that the state prohibitory statute was not a dram shop
act, since there was no express provision for civil liability and it
could not be turned into one by judicial legislation. The opinion
disposed of cases allowing recovery on negligence principles for
violations of similar statutes by demonstrating that these latter laws
furnished sanctions only against the licensed vendor,7" whereas Ar-
kansas punished sales to the prohibited class by any person.71 The
court was unwilling to create a civil cause of action based upon this
statute, for it felt that such action could render anyone serving a
social drink in his home liable in damages.
The most recent state to reconsider the problem was Louisiana
in the case of Lee v Peerless Ins. Co.,72 wherein the state supreme
court held that there had never been a cause of action against the
innkeeper at common law and that the state prohibitory statute did
not create one.
Despite the prevailing attitude, as evidenced by the decisions
cited above, an increasing number of jurisdictions are recognizing
that the violation of prohibitory statutes is a factor to be considered
in imposing liability based upon common law principles. Five juris-
dictions have indicated that such a statutory violation is negligence
per se.73 Here the prohibitory statutes take on the aspects of a dram
shop act, since it would seem that mere violation of the statute would
automatically create a civil cause of action. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court has stated tersely that violation of the applicable
regulatory statute is evdence of negligence.74
68 63 Ariz. at 289-90, 162 P.2d at 127
69 Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965).
70 Id. at 891, 385 S.W.2d at 657 The court cited cases from New Jersey, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania.
71 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-901 (1964)
72 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966).
73 See Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Windorski v. Doyle,
219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d 142 (1945); Mitchell v. Ketner, 393 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1964), cert. dented, Tenn. Sup. Ct., July 6, 1965; Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117 N.W.2d 347 (1962). The latter three cases denied recov-
ery, however, and the statements were more or less dicta. Pennsylvania, on the other
hand, has repeatedly held that violation of the state prohibitory statute is negligence per
se. See Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, Inc., 416 Pa. 235, 205 A.2d 873 (1965); Smith v.
Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963); Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d
367 (1960).
74 Ramsey v. Anctil 211 A.2d 900, 901 (N.H. 1965)
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In the remaining states which have passed on the question, the
violation of state regulatory provisions has usually been cited in the
opinions, but it is not altogether clear just what weight the courts
have attributed to such violation. Most of the courts associate the
prohibition on sales to certain classes with a duty on the tavern own-
er's part not to make such sales, and the courts conclude that this
duty extends to, and can be enforced by, the public. The language
of Rappaport v. Nichols7 so indicates:
tTlhe Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control has pro-
vided that no licensee shall permit any minor to be served or con-
sume any alcoholic beverages; and the same regulation contains a
provision against service to or consumption by any person "actu-
ally or apparently intoxicated." It seems dear to us that these
broadly expressed restrictions were not narrowly intended to bene-
fit the minors and intoxicated persons alone but were wisely in-
tended for the protection of members of the general public as
well.76
Cases in other states have expressly held that the duty created by
the regulatory provisions of liquor control acts extends to, and is for
the protection of, the public.77 Indeed, the heart of the question
seems to be whether the evil complained of is one which the statute
was intended to correct. A reading of the cases denying recovery
for the statutory violation indicates that if there is any duty at all it
does not extend beyond the specified class of persons. The best
that can be said of this problem is that the states are divided in their
interpretations of the various liquor control acts, with perhaps half
of the jurisdictions which have considered the role of such legislation
holding that a violation is some indication of common law negli-
gence.
B. Pre-emptzon m States With Dram Shop Acts
There are any number of reasons why an injured party may wish
to escape from the statutory limitations imposed by state dram shop
acts,78 and the question occasionally arises as to whether or not the
75 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
76 Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8.
77 Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965), wherein
the court, referring to § 65 of the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, said that
'The purpose of such a statute in imposing such a duty is for the protection of the pub-
lic." Id. at 384, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 294. See also Waynick v. Chicago s Last Dep't Store,
269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960)
78 The two most common reasons are the dollar limits mposed on recovery in many
states, e.g., $15,000 limit for injury to persons or property and $20,000 for loss of sup-
port, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); $20,000 limitation for
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existence of such an act pre-empts the field, so as to preclude any
cause of action at common law Many of the older cases contain
language to the effect that the dram shop laws created rights and
liabilities unknown to the common law.79 A few courts have stated
that the statutory remedy is exclusive; however, these statements
usually appear in jurisdictions which have never accepted the com-
mon law theory of recovery.8° In one federal case, an attempt to
predicate the innkeeper's liability on a violation of Illinois' regula-
tory legislation was rejected on the grounds that the statute, which
forbade the sale of liquor to certain classes, was closely followed by
the Illinois Civil Damage Act,8' and if the regulatory statute created
a cause of action at common law, then the dram shop act was just so
much excess verbiage.8"
There seems to be a general rule of tort law, however, that the
existence of a statute does not prevent an action for common law
negligence." Minnesota, which has a dram shop act, 4 has indicated
in at least one case that the statutory and common law causes of
action can run concurrently and that the existence of one does not
preclude the other.8 " The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that
the existence of a dram shop act precludes any cause of action under
the state liquor control act, but in the same opinion the court went
on to discuss the common law negligence theory, indicating that if
such a cause of action did exist, it may not be precluded by the dram
injuries to the person and $50,000 for injuries suffered "in consequence" of the inn-
keeper's acts, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (Supp. 1965); $500 limitation for all
types of recovery, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 716 (1953), and the short one-year statute
of limitations which is in effect in several states, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
30-122 (Supp. 1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1963) In addition, statutory
construction has produced a number of procedural problems under the statutes in some
states.
79 Schulte v. Schleeper, 210 IUl. 357, 71 N.E. 325 (1904); Freese v. Tripp, 70 ill.
496 (1873); Zibold v. Reneer, 73 Kan. 312, 85 Pac. 290 (1906); Gardner v. Day, 95
Me. 558, 50 Ad. 892 (1901); Sworski v. Colman, 204 Minn. 474, 283 N.W 778
(1939); Healey v. Cady, 104 Vt. 463, 161 Ad. 151 (1932); Demge v. Feierstein, 222
Wis. 199, 268 N.W 210 (1936).
8 0 Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (Super. Ct. 1955); Howlett
v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949); Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258
Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 131 (1960); Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 72
N.W.2d 609 (1955).
81 ILL. R EV. STAT. ch. 43, §§ 135-36 (1963).
82 Rogers v. Dwight, 145 F. Supp. 537, 540 (E.D. Wis. 1956) (applying Illinois
law).
83 PROSSER, TORTS § 64 (3d ed. 1964)
84 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1957).
8 5 Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d 142 (1945). For an excellent
discussion of this case and Minnesota law in general, see Note, 49 MINN. L. RETv. 1154
(1965).
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shop act. 6 In Illinois, the courts have held that a cause of action
grounded on common law negligence can be maintained in inter-
state tort situations in which the state dram shop acts are not
applicable.8
7
The only state which appears to have expressly decided the ques-
tion in favor of allowing the common law action is New York. In
Berkeley v. Park,8" the New York court first decided that a cause of
action grounded on ordinary negligence was available against liquor
vendors and then addressed itself to the issue of whether this cause
of action was abrogated by the statutory remedy. Since nothing
in the dram shop act itself purported to do so, the court felt that
an injured party should not be restricted to a single remedy if others
are available, and the common law action was allowed.
The question of pre-emption has not been frequently litigated
either because the common law theory is a recent development or
because the issue does not arise in states which have dram shop acts.
One may conclude, however, that there are four possible theories as
to the pre-emptive effects of state dram shop acts: (1) the statutory
remedy is exclusive, and precludes all other theories of recovery;
(2) the dram shop and common law actions are coexistent, the for-
mer not precluding the latter; (3) the dram shop act is exclusive
in situations falling within its coverage, but where the act is not ap-
plicable, the common law cause of action can be maintained; 9 and
(4) the dram shop act precludes any other statutory theory of re-
covery but not the common law action based on negligence. "
C. Contributory Negligence
If a cause of action exists against the innkeeper at common law,
does contributory negligence on the part of the injured plaintiff bar
86 Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117 N.W.2d 347 (1962).
8 7 Waymck v. Chicago s Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 IMI. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292
(1963) (following the prevailing conflicts of law principles, unproved Indiana law was
applied as Illinois common law).
88 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
8 9 The courts in Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cit.
1959), cert. dented, 362 U.S. 903 (1960), and Colligan v. Cousar, 38 III. App. 2d 392,
187 N.E.2d 292 (1963) (following the prevailing conflicts of laws principles, unproved
Indiana law was applied as Illinois common law), were faced only with situations in
which the Illinois Dram Shop Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, §§ 135-36 (1963), did not
apply because an extra-territorial fact situation was involved. It is interesting to specu-
late how the same courts would rule in a situation where the dram shop act was not
available for other reasons, perhaps because plaintiff had not brought suit within the
short one-year statute of limitations prescribed in the act.9 0 Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117 N.W.2d 347 (1962).
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recovery? In rare cases, the defense has been held to be available
against injured third parties under the dram shop acts. These situa-
tions usually arise when the injured party has contributed to the in-
toxication of the tort-feasor, or voluntarily rides with him in a
vehicle. 1  Other courts have denied the defense because dram shop
acts create a wholly statutory cause of action and provide a standard
of conduct which enunciates the public policy of the state. There-
fore, if the tavern owner violates that standard, he is liable despite
the disregard of the claimant for his own safety. 2  No case has
been found where the defense of contributory negligence was raised
against an injured third person in a common law liquor liability sit-
uation, but it would seem that, with no statute involved, such a de-
fense would be available on ordinary common law principles.
Far more important than the question of the contributory negli-
gence of injured third persons is that of the negligence of the injured
patron himself. There is a split of authority in the jurisdictions
which have faced this question. The Connecticut high court, in
denying that there is any remedy available either to the patron
or an injured third party in a common law action,93 stated
that, in any case, contributory negligence would be available as a
defense against the patron. The Supreme Courts of Florida,94 New
York, 5 and Louisiana96 have expressed the opinion that if a cause
of action does exist in favor of an injured customer at common law,
contributory negligence would bar his recovery. New Hampshire,
after examining contrasting decisions in other states, notably Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey, broke with these jurisdictions and decided
that contributory negligence would be available to bar the recovery
of an injured patron in a common law action based on the violation
of a statutory duty 7
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, two states which allow recovery
91 Cookinham v. Sullivan, 23 Conn. Supp. 193, 179 A.2d 840 (Super. Ct. 1962);
Liff v. Haezbroeck, 51 Ill. App. 2d 70, 200 N.E.2d 525 (1964); Engleken v. Hitger, 43
Iowa 563 (1876); Kearney v. Fitzgerald, 43 Iowa 580 (1876).
92 Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 (2d Cit. 1964); Krotzer v. Drinka, 344 Ii. App.
256, 100 N.E.2d 518 (1951).
93Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (Super. Ct. 1955)
94 Reed v. Black Caesar's Forge Gourmet Restaurant, Inc., 165 So. 2d 787 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965)
95 Moyer v. Lo Jim Cafe, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 523, 240 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1963),
aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 792, 200 N.E.2d 212, 251 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1964) The case is of doubt-
ful authority, however, in light of the more recent decision in Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc.
2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
9 6 Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966)
97 Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965).
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by the injured patron, have almost of necessity found that con-
tributory negligence is not available to the tavern owner as a de-
fense. Their courts have reasoned that since state liquor regulation
laws" give rise to a duty on the innkeeper's part not to serve the des-
ignated classes of persons, the availability of contributory negligence
as a defense would render the statutory duty meaningless.9 There-
fore, these courts follow the general rule and hold that con-
tributory negligence is not available as a defense to a statutory tort
where the effect of the statute is to place entire responsibility for the
harm upon the defendant...0 A statement from the recent Pennsyl-
vania case of Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, Inc."' is typical. Citing
the Restatement of Torts, the court said:
If the defendanes negligence consists in the violation of
a statute enacted to protect a class of persons from their inability
to exercise self-protective care, a member of such class is not barred
by his contributory negligence from recovery for bodily harm
caused by the violation of such statute. 02
A federal court applying New Jersey law in Galvin v. Jenntngs03
used a slightly modified version of this reasoning and held that if
the defendant innkeeper's conduct was willful and wanton, con-
tributory negligence would not bar recovery by an injured patron.
So far as the intoxicated person himself is concerned, the reason-
ing of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey courts appears to be sound.
If recovery on his part is desirable, then his contributory negligence
cannot be a defense, as it would automatically operate to bar his re-
covery in all cases.
D Causation
As already mentioned, jurisdictions which accept the common
law theory of recovery reason that it is the serving and not the con-
sumption of alcohol, which is the proximate cause of intoxication
98 See, e.g., the statutes cited in notes 58-62 supra.
99 Soronea v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966)
100 REsTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS § 483 (1965). See also Comment, Contribu-
tory Negligence as a Defense to a Statutory Tort, 18 U. Ci. L. REv. 779 (1948).
1l 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d- 873 (1965).
1021d. at 269, 205 A.2d at 876 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 483
(1965))
103 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cit. 1961). The court held that contributory negligence
would not be available as a defense when, after leaving the defendant's establishment,
the plaintiff was so intoxicated that the bartender had to go outside and give the plain-
tiff specific instructions regarding which way to turn the wheel so that he could drive
out of the parking lot.
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and which sets off the chain of events leading to ultimate injury.
The act of the patron in consuming the liquor is a contributing fac-
tor, but it is not such an intervening cause as would break the chain
of forseeable results leading from the original negligent act of the
innkeeper to the resultant injury. In actuality this is little more
than an application of the accepted tort rule that a forseeable inter-
vening cause does not break the chain of causation and relieve the
original actor from liability. °4
Can an innkeeper escape liability by showing that his act of serv-
ing alcohol did not contribute to the tort-feasor's intoxication?
Generally, the courts which have accepted the common law cause of
action have held that the innkeeper's act need only be a "substantial
factor" in bringing about the injury in order to sustain liability,0 5
and, as a practical matter, non-contribution to a state of intoxication
would be virtually impossible to prove. Most of the courts would
probably agree with opinions rendered in dram shop act cases that
the serving of one drink is enough to make the innkeeper liable.'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, has said that the inn-
keeper may also seek to prove that his customer was already so
inebriated when he arrived that the subsequent drink did nothing to
worsen his already hopeless condition."'
IV ANALOGOUS TORT SITUATIONS AT COMMON LAW
Courts which have allowed recovery against the liquor vendor
at common law have usually supported their reasoning by making
some reference to a number of analogous tort situations in which
recovery has not been questioned. Some of the more commonly
discussed situations are treated below.
104 See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Waynick v.
Chicago s Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. dened, 362 U.S. 903
(1960) and the discussion therein. See also the excellent discussion of causation in Lee
v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 1002-06, 183 So. 2d 328, 335-36 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
105 Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 203, 156 A.2d 1, 9 (1959); Lee v. Peerless
Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 1002-06, 183 So. 2d 328, 335-36 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
106 See, e.g., Phillips v. Derrick, 36 Ala. App. 244, 54 So. 2d 320 (1951); Pierce v.
Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed for want of a substantrl fed-
eral question, 355 U.S. 15 (1957), Tresch v. Nielsen, 57 Ill. App. 2d 469, 207 N.E.2d
109 (1965) Iowa, however, requires a showing that the sale directly contributed to
the tort-feasor's intoxication and that the damages are separable. Bellison v. A. Apland
& Co., 115 Iowa 599, 89 N.W 22 (1902)
107 Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, Inc., 416 Pa. 235, 205 A.2d 873 (1965). The case
modified earlier Pennsylvania decisions which seemed to indicate that the sale of one
drink to a drunkard would be negligence per se. See Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190
A.2d 441 (1963); Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960).
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A. Ltability of the Druggist for Sales of Habit-Forming Drugs
One situation commonly referred to in the liquor cases is the lia-
bility of a druggist for sales of habit-forming drugs to an addicted
customer. Early cases held that the husband or wife of the vendee
could recover at common law for loss of consortium if the sale was
made by the vendor with knowledge of the intended use.1°8 Perhaps
the most influential case in this area is Flandermeyer v. Cooper,"0 9
decided in 1912 by the Ohio Supreme Court. In Flandermeyer the
wife of an addict was allowed to recover against a vendor even
though he had violated no statute in making the sale and without
regard to whether or not the sale had been made with the wife's
knowledge. Perhaps the drug cases represent a stronger intra-fam-
ily tort situation than do the liquor cases and go no further than to
recognize a cause of action for loss of consortium, a situation which
exists in a greater number of jurisdictions than is true of the ordinary
liquor liability case."' On the basis of theory, however, the two
situations are indistinguishable. The principles of duty, proximate
cause, and forseeability of harm through the negligent acts of the
vendor are identical, and it cannot logically be said today that an
intoxicated person is any more responsible for his acts than a drug
addict.
B. Unlawful Sales of Firearms to Minors
Another analogous situation referred to by courts in sustaining
actions against innkeepers at common law is the illegal sale or negli-
gent entrustment of firearms to minors. The classic case is Ander-
son v. Settergren,"' a 1907 Minnesota suit in which the defendant
sold cartridges and loaned a rifle to a minor in violation of a state
statute; the minor subsequently fired it, injuring the plaintiff. The
court sustained a common law charge alleging negligence, stating that
the prohibitory statute was for the benefit of both the minor and the
public and that the firing of the gun was not an intervening act
which would break the chain of causation leading back to the negli-
gent vendor. A similar case arose in fllinois in 1954, wherein the
108 Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. 202 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867); Holleman v. Harward, 119
N.C. 150, 25 S.E. 972 (1896); Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102
(1912).
109 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912).
110 Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940); Swanson v. Bal, 67 S.D. 161,
290 N.W 482 (1940).
111 100 Minn. 294, 111 N.W 279 (1907)
1966]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
court sustained a complaint against a vendor who sold an air rifle to
a child;" 2 the point most emphasized in the opinion was the for-
seeability of harm arising from sales of firearms to those inexperi-
enced in their use and too young to be responsible." 3 It is also
interesting to note that the Minnesota court in Anderson held that
the violation of the prohibitory statute was negligence per se." 4
In addition it should be pointed out that the firearms cases were
cited with approval in Rappaport v. Nichols."5
A recent Florida case allowed recovery against a liquor vendor
almost entirely on the authority of a firearms case. In Davis v
Shiappacossee, referred to earlier,"' the court alluded to the case of
Tam am Gun Shop v Klen,"7 wherein a gun dealer sold a rifle to
a minor in violation of a city ordinance, and the minor subsequently
shot off his thumb. The court held that the sale in violation of the
statute was negligence per se, asserting that the two cases were
indistingushable."'
If accidents and injury are a forseeable result of negligent en-
trustment of firearms to minors, they are no less forseeable to the
bartender who serves an intoxicated person, particularly if that cus-
tomer is driving. Indeed, the drunken driver is a much greater
menace to the American public than the incompetent with a fire-
arm, if only by the relative number of incidents.
C. Negligent Entrustment of Vehicles
A third situation often cited by analogy in liquor liability cases
is that arising from the negligent entrustment of vehicles to incom-
petent drivers. In Sadler v Draper,"' the Tennessee Court of Ap-
peals allowed an injured third party to recover against an owner
whose agent entrusted the vehicle to an intoxicated driver with a
reputation for drunkenness. Similarly, in V L. Nicholson Constr
Co. v Lane,2' recovery was allowed against an owner who loaned
his car to a known drunkard, even though the latter was not drinking
112 Semeniuk v. Chenos, 1 II. App. 2d 508, 117 N.E.2d 883 (1954).
113 Id. at 512-13, 117 N.E.2d at 885-86.
114 100 Minn. at 295, 111 N.W at 279.
115 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
116 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963) See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
117 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959).
118 155 So. 2d at 367
11946 Tenn. App. 1, 326 S.W.2d 148 (1959), cert. denmd, Tenn. Sup. Ct., July 27,
1959.
120 177 Tenn. 440, 150 S.W.2d 1069 (1941).
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at the tme. Both cases were cited by the Tennessee Court of Ap-
peals as being indistinguishable from the negligent sale of intoxi-
cants to minors in a recent case which recognized the common law
liability of liquor vendors.121 Ohio has also recognized the right of
an injured third person to recover against the owner of a vehicle
who negligently entrusts it to a driver whom he knows to be a
reckless or careless person.122
Several jurisdictions have gone one step further by allowing the
injured party to recover against an owner who leaves his vehicle
in such a condition that it is likely to be stolen and driven negli-
gently. In Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2' the Illinois Supreme Court
allowed a motorist to recover for the negligence of a taxicab driver
who left his key in the ignition of his unattended vehicle in viola-
tion of a statute, thereby allowing a thief to steal the car and run
over the plaintiff. The court said that the statute was intended for
the safety of the public, that the violation of it was "prima facie evi-
dence of negligence,"' 24 and that the act of the thief was not such an
unforseeable intervening cause as to break the chain of causation.
Recovery was permitted in a similar case,"25 wherein a truck was
stolen and driven negligently after the keys were left in the ignition
in violation of a District of Columbia ordinance. An Ohio common
pleas court, in Garbo v. Walker,'26 reached a similar result in hold-
ing that violation of a city statute prohibiting the parking of a ve-
hicle in the street without securing the ignition switch was negli-
gence per se.
Again, the analogies to the common law liability of the liquor
vendor are obvious. Loaning a vehicle to an incompetent person or
leaving the keys in the ignition are instances of placing an instru-
mentality of harm in the hands of the wrongdoer, whereas plying
him with intoxicating liquor increases the likelihood that he will use
that instrumentality in a negligent manner. Both can be said to be
a "proximate cause" or at the very least a "substantial factor" in
bringing about any resultant injury, and the forseeability of harm is
identical in both situations.
'
21 Mitchell v. Ketner, 393 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (dictum), cert.
dented, Tenn. Sup. Ct, July 6, 1965.
122 Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio St. 186, 126 N.E. 66 (1919).
123 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
124 Id. at 78-79, 117 N.E.2d at 78.
125 Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
126 129 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio C.P. 1955). See Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 633, 641 (1957).
See generally td. at 635-37
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D Failure of a State Mental Hospital To Protect Inmates
Although somewhat remote from the liquor vendor's common
law liability situation, a recent New York case readily illustrates
how far some courts are extending the proximate cause-forseeabiity
rationale and why it is ridiculous to hold that it does not apply in
allowing a recovery against the tavern owner at common law In
Williams v State,' a female inmate of a state mental hospital was
sexually assaulted by another inmate and as a result gave birth
to a mentally deficient child. The child sued, by its guardian, for
the negligence of the hospital in allowing it to be born in such a
defective state. The court found that the hospital owed a duty to
the mother to protect her from fellow inmates and reasoned that if
the hospital was negligent in discharging this duty, a deficient child
was a foreseeable result. The hospital was therefore held liable to
the child for its injury, from the time of conception.
The above-mentioned cases are illustrative of situations in which
the courts have allowed recovery to injured third persons against
the party creating the dangerous situation despite the intervening
acts of tort-feasors. There would seem to be no logical reason for
separating the liquor vendor from this trend, since he creates the
dangerous situation by contributing to the intoxication of a potential
tort-feasor. There is no reason for the courts to insulate him.
V LIABILITY OF THE LIQUOR VENDOR IN OHIO
Ohio has had a dram shop act since 1854.121 Originally quite
stringent, the statute was amended in 1910 to read as follows:
A husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other per-
son injured in person, property, or means of support by an intoxi-
cated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or
otherwise, of a person, after the issuance and during the existence
of the order of the department of liquor control prohibiting the
sale of intoxicating liquor as defined in section 4301.01 of the
Revised Code to such person, has a right of action in his own
name, severally or jointly, against any person selling or giving in-
toxicating liquors which cause such intoxication, in whole or in
part, of such person.12 9
Decisions under the amended act have been scarce, but they do seem
to indicate that the act is applicable only if the order of the Depart-
ment of Liquor Control, prohibiting sales to the designated persons,
12746 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. C1. 1965)
128 52 Ohio Laws 153.
129 OHIO REV. CODE § 4399.01.
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is in effect In Ramon v. Spike,"1 one of the few decisions under
the amended act, an innkeeper sold liquor to an intoxicated minor
who later drove onto the sidewalk, injuring a pedestrian. The com-
plaint did not allege that the innkeeper had notice not to serve the
youth, and the court held that the issuance of the order was a pre-
requisite to suit, without wich there was no cause of action under
the dram shop act.13' Similarly, in Love v. Fountas, '2 the plaintiff
alleged that the decedent's death was caused by eight double shots
of liquor served to him by the defendant tavern owners in viola-
tion of section 4301.22, the Oio prohibitory statute. The com-
plaint contained no reference to the dram shop act, and the court
sustained defendant's demurrer, stating that the only benefits to in-
jured parties arose out of the dram shop act and if the drunkard was
not blacklisted as therein provided, there was no cause of action.'
Therefore, even if the sale of liquor is illegal, no statutory cause of
action arises unless the drunkard has been blacklisted as provided in
section 4399.01 of the Ohio Revised Code.
These two cases illustrate the serious deficiency in the Ohio act.
Unless a blacklisting order of the Department of Liquor Control is
in effect, a patron can become highly intoxicated with the knowledge
of the innkeeper, and no liability will attach to the latter if the
inebriate subsequently injures himself or another. Moreover, since
only habitual drunkards are usually blacklisted, the act makes no
provision whatsoever for minors or for the reasonably prudent man
who goes on a once-in-a-lifetime drinking spree and then becomes
unreasonable, imprudent, and highly intoxicated. Recognition of a
cause of action at common law would serve to eliminate this iatus
in Oio law.
The question of whether or not a cause of action does exist
against the innkeeper at common law does not appear to have been
litigated in Ohio, unless Ramon and Love can be read as denying
the action. The problem was discussed in Chrfstoff v. Gradsky, 4
wherein the court recognized the prevailing view at that time to
be that there was no cause of action at common law; however,
130 92 Ohio App. 49, 109 N.E.2d 327 (1951).
13 1 Apparently, under this decision even a minor must be blacklisted, by name, be-
fore any cause of action would arise against the innkeeper. In retrospect, it seems ri-
diculous to require the blacklisting of every individual under the age of twenty-one in
order to give rise to liability. There thus seems to be no cause of action under the Ohio
act against innkeepers who serve minors.
13 2 119 Ohio App. 501, 200 NE.2d 715 (1963).
133 Id. at 502, 200 N.E.2d at 716.
134 140 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio C.P 1956).
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the discussion appears to have been dictum only and antedates more
recent decisions in other states recognizing such actions.
A case squarely raising the common law question will soon be
considered by the court of appeals of Stark County In Robinson
v Stilgenbauer, one Clyde E. Stilgenbauer became intoxicated as
a result of early morning drinking in several bars, only one of which
apparently had notice from the Board of Liquor Control not to serve
him. At least one of the other bars admitted knowledge that Stil-
genbauer drank to excess, however, and admitted serving him beer
and whiskey at approximately 7.15 in the morning. Counsel for
the plaintiff argued that the serving of liquor to Stilgenbauer under
such conditions constituted negligence at common law and proxi-
mately resulted in the death of four motorists when Stilgenbauer
drove across the center line of the highway and collided with their
oncoming vehicle. The court, however, granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the tavern owner who had not been served with
notice, and at the time of this writing the case is on appeal. The
Robinson case will afford an excellent opportunity for Ohio to fol-
low the line of reasoning of the more enlightened jurisdictions
which have recognized a cause of action at common law against the
liquor vendor. Ohio has already recognized common law causes of
action arising from the sale of habit-forming drugs'36 and from the
negligent entrustment of vehicles,"' both of which seem mdistin-
gushable in theory from a common law cause of action against the
innkeeper. Moreover, the action would not be unfair to the tavern
owner, because he has all the defenses available in ordinary negli-
gence cases, with the possible exception of contributory negligence.
He can, for instance, show that his action did not contribute to the
intoxication of the patron or that the patron was not visibly intoxi-
cated when served. These defenses would afford the innkeeper
more protection than is available under some of the more stringent
dram shop acts.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident from the declining popularity of dram shop acts
that the courts have not accepted them as the final answer as re-
gards the liquor vendor's liability. The most dynamic development
in recent years has been the rapid change in the old common law
135 Case no. 108874, Stark County Ct. C.P., Ohio, Aug. 17, 1966.
136 Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912).
137 Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio St. 186, 126 N.E. 66 (1919) (dictum).
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rule that the innkeeper is not responsible for injuries caused or sus-
tained by his intoxicated customer. A number of jurisdictions, in-
cluding Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire,
Florida, and Illinois, have reversed this rule and presently allow re-
covery against liquor vendors in common law actions. Other states
have indicated a willingness to follow suit.
There seems to be no good reason why a cause of action at com-
mon law against an innkeeper, should not lie, when that action is
based on duty, proximate cause, and forseeability of harm. Indeed,
the no-liability rule for innkeepers seems to be a novelty which no
other businessman enjoys in the historical development of negli-
gence theories. Moreover, the common law action is more equit-
able to the innkeepers themselves than the dram shop acts, inasmuch
as the former preserves for them a number of defenses not ordinarily
available under the statutes. It is to be hoped that Ohio will follow
the enlightened leadership of other states and recognize the cause
of action at common law against innkeepers who knowingly con-
tribute to the intoxication of tort-feasors.
FRANcIs A. KING
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